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Abstrat
We show that quantum game theory oers solution to the famous
Newomb's paradox (free will problem). Divine foreknowledge is not
neessary for suessful ompletion of the game beause quantum the-
ory oers a way to disern human intentions in suh way that the
human retain her/his free will but annot prot from hanging de-
ision. Possible interpretation in terms of quantum market games is
proposed.
PACS numbers: 02.50.Le, 03.67.-a, 03.65.Bz
1 Introdution
There is a ommon belief that the harateristi size of the brain's integral
parts is too big to allow for quantum eets being important [1℄. But re-
ent experiments show that separated objets of the size of a golf ball an
form quantum entangled states even in a room temperature [2℄. Physiists
suessfully apply quantum mehanis to desribe a lot of omplex system
that may have in priniple arbitrary size, inluding blak holes or even the
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whole Universe. Are there any reasons for quantum modeling of phenomena
related to brain ativity, onsiousness or soial behaviour? One an give
an answer to this question only after onstrution and thorough veriation
of respetive models [3℄. Below we onsider a problem easily suseptible of
modeling as a quantum game that should shed some light on the solutions
that quantum theory may oer.
In 1960 William Newomb, a physiist, intrigued the philosopher Robert
Nozik with a laim that in an elementary game haraterized by the matrix
M
M :=
(
$1000 $1 001 000
0 $1 000 000
)
(1)
giving the pay-o of the player 1 in all possible situations, the player 1 is
not able to hose his strategy without having any measure of ourring a
posteriori of any of the four possible events. Rows orrespond the player
1's strategies: feminine |0〉1 and masuline |1〉11 and olumns to opponent's
strategies |0〉2, |1〉2. It so happens even despite the fat that the feminine
strategy dominates the masuline one (that is the pay-o is greater regardless
of the opponents strategy). The hoie of the masuline strategy |1〉1 is more
protable when the event orresponding to the o-diagonal elements ofM do
not our and the rest have almost equal probabilities. This might happen if
the opponent is able to foresee the player 1 moves. Due to this paradoxial
property the above game with indenite (hidden) set of ourrenes beame
for philosophers, eonomists and theologians a graeful theme of speulations
about free will and its onsequenes [4, 5℄. The disputes, often referred to
as newombmania [6℄, deserve a thorough analyzis from the quantum game
theory point of view [7℄-[11℄. The development of the probability theory
provide us with many intriguing examples where ambiguous speiation of
the appropriate probability measures resulted in ontradition (Bertrand [13℄
and Banah-Tarski [14℄ paradoxes are the most famous ones). One an still
nd people who regardless of this fats ontinue philosophial disputes while
ignoring the neessity of preise denition of the probabilisti measures in
their models. We would like to show that quantum theory may be of help in
settling the ambiguities.
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The use of the adjetives feminine and masuline to underline the harater of the
strategies will be explained later, see also the Gardner book
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2 Quantum desription of the game
Quantum game theory exploits the formalism of quantum mehanis in order
to oer the players new lasses of strategies. Interesting generalization of well
known lassial games have been put forward [7, 8℄. There are arguments
that quantum strategies may oer extraordinary tools for biologists [15℄-
[17℄. Eonomis being the theater of various games and onits should not
despise these new ideas [18, 12℄. We will desribe player's strategies as vetors
(often referred to as states) in Hilbert spaes Hi where the subsripts i = 1, 2
distinguish between the player 1 and 2. It is onvenient to dene the strategy
density operator W
W =
2∑
r,s=1
Wrs|r−1〉1 |s−1〉2 1〈r−1| 2〈s−1|
where (Wrs) is a matrix with nonnegative entries suh that
∑
r,s
Wrs = 1 and
|r〉1 |s〉2 1〈r| 2〈s|, r, s∈{0, 1} are projetive operators on the states of the game,
|r〉1|s〉2 ∈ H1⊗H2. For our aims it will be suient to use two dimensional
Hilbert spaes for the players' strategies. The states of the lassial setting
(mixed strategies) are represented by a diagonal matrix (Wrs). Non-diagonal
elements of (Wrs) desribe situations (strategies) that are out of the reah for
lassial players. Following the lassial terminology we will all the pay-o
observable M a Hermitian operator orresponding to the matrix (1):
M :=
2∑
r,s=1
Mrs|r−1〉1 |s−1〉2 1〈r−1| 2〈s−1| .
Therefore, aording to the lassial interpretation of the game, the player
1's expeted pay-o is equal to the sum of diagonal elements (trae) of the
produt of M and the transpose of W :
E(M) := TrMW =
∑
rs
MrsWrs = TrMW
T .
3 Newomb's paradox
M. Gardner proposed the following fabulous desription of a game with pay-
o given by the matrix (1) [4℄. An alien Omega (or Alf?) being a omnisent
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representative of alien ivilization (player 2) oers a human (player 1) a
hoie between two boxes. The player 1 an take the ontent of both boxes
or only the ontent of the seond one. The rst one is transparent and
ontains $1000. Omega delares to have put into the seond box that is not
transparent $1000000 (strategy |1〉2) but only if he foresaw that the player 1
deided to take only the ontent of that box (|1〉1). A male player 1 thinks: If
Omega knows what I am going to do then I have the hoie between $1000 and
$1000000. Therefore I take the $1000000 (strategy |1〉1). A female player
1 thinks: Its obvious that I want to take the only the ontent of the seond
box therefore Omega foresaw it and put the $1000000 into the box. So the
one million dollar is in the seond box. Why should I not take more  I take
the ontent of both boxes (strategy |0〉1). The question is whose strategy,
male's or female's, is better? One annot give unambiguous answer to this
question without preise denition of the measures of the events relevant for
the pay-o.
4 Human's and Omega's strategies
Omega as representative of an advaned alien ivilization is ertainly aware
of quantum properties of the Universe that are still obsure or mysterious to
humans. The boxes ontaining pay-os are probably oupled. One an sus-
pet this beause the human annot take ontent of the transparent box only
($1000). The female player is septial about the possibility of realization of
the Omega's senario for the game. She thinks that the hoie of the male
strategy results in Omega putting the one million dollar in the seond box,
and after this being done no one an prevent from her taking the ontent of
the both boxes in question (ie $1001000). But Meyer proposed a quantum
tatis [7℄ that, if adopted by Omega, allows Omega to aomplish his se-
nario. Let us note that Omega may not be able to foresee the future [4℄. For
it aims it is suient that it is able to disern human intentions regardless
of their will or feelings on the matter. The obstales to this implied by the
no-loning theorem an be overome by means of teleportation [19℄: Omega
has must be able to interept and then return human's strategies. The pre-
sented below manipulations leading to thwarting humans are feasible with
ontemporary tehnologies. The ourse of the game may look as follows. At
the starting-point, the density operator W ating on H1⊗H2 desribes the
human's intended strategy and the Omega's strategy based on its predition
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of human's intentions. The atual game must be arried on aording to
quantum rules that is players are allowed to hange the state of the game
by unitary ation on W [7, 8℄. The human player an only at on her/his
q-bit Hilbert spae H1. Omega's tatis must not depend on the atual move
performed by the human player (it may not be aware of the human strategy):
its moves are performed by automati devie that ouples the boxes. The
Meyer's reipe leads to:
1. Just before the human's move, Omega set the automati devise a-
ording to its knowledge of human's intention. The devie exeutes the
tatis F⊗I, where I is the identity transform (Omega annot hange
its deision) and F is the well known Hadamard transform frequently
used in quantum algorithms: F := 1√
2
(
1 1
1 −1
)
.
2. The human player with the probability w uses the female tatis N⊗I ,
where N is the negation operator2 and with the probability 1−w the
male tatis I ⊗ I.
3. At the nal step the boxes are being opened and the built-in oupling
mehanism performs one more the transform F ⊗ I and the game is
settled.
5 The ourse of the game and its result
Let us analyze the evolution of the density operatorW. The players' tatis,
by denition, ould have resulted in hanges in the (sub-)spae H1 only
therefore it sues to analyze the human's strategies. In a general ase the
human an use a mixed strategy: the female one with the probability v and
the male one with the probability 1−v. Let us begin with the extreme values
of v (pure strategies). If the human deided to use the female strategy (v=1)
or the male one (v=0) then the matries Wi, i = 0, 1 orresponding to the
density operators
W0 =
2∑
r,s=1
W0rs|r−1〉1 |0〉2 1〈s−1| 2〈0|
2N|0〉 = |1〉, N|1〉 = |0〉
5
and
W1 =
2∑
r,s=1
W1rs|r−1〉1 |1〉2 1〈s−1| 2〈1|
are alulated as follows:
(
v 0
0 1− v
)
−→ 1
2
(
1 1
1 −1
)(
v 0
0 1−v
)(
1 1
1 −1
)
= 1
2
(
1 2v−1
2v−1 1
)
−→
w
2
(
0 1
1 0
)(
1 2v−1
2v−1 1
)(
0 1
1 0
)
+ 1−w
2
(
1 2v−1
2v−1 1
)
= 1
2
(
1 2v−1
2v−1 1
)
−→
1
4
(
1 1
1 −1
)(
1 2v−1
2v−1 1
)(
1 1
1 −1
)
=
(
v 0
0 1− v
)
.
It is obvious that independently of the used tatis, human's strategy takes
the starting form. For the mixed strategy the ourse of the game is desribed
by the density operator
W = vW0 + (1−v)W1
whih also has the same diagonal form at the beginning and at the end of
the game:
W = v |0〉1 |0〉2 1〈0| 2〈0|+ (1−v) |1〉1 |1〉2 1〈1| 2〈1| .
Therefore the hange of mind resulting from the female strategy annot lead
to any additional prots. If the human using the female tatis (that is
hanges his/her mind) begins the game with the female strategy then at the
end the untransparent box will be empty and he/she will not get the ontent
of the transparent box: the pay-o will be minimal (0). If the human ats just
the opposite the transparent box must not be opened but nevertheless the
pay-o will be maximal ($100000). Only if the human begins with the female
strategy and then applies the male tatis the ontent of the transparent box
is aessible. If restrited to the lassial game theory Omega would have
to prevent humans from hanging their minds. In the quantum domain the
pay-o M21 (female strategy and tatis) is possible (the phrase la donna
mobile gets a quantum ontext): humans regain their free will but they have
to remember that Omega has (quantum) means to prevent humans from
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proting from altering their deisions. In that way quantum approah allows
to remove the paradox from the rationally dened dilemma. One an also
onsider games with more alternatives for the human player. The respetive
larger pay-o matries would oer even more sophistiated versions of the
Newomb's observation. But even then there is a quantum protool that
guarantees that Omega keeps its promises (threats) [21℄.
6 Market interpretation of the game
It is obvious that the above senario annot be realized if the atual on-
ditions would dier from Omega's promises. For example, Omega may not
be able to predit humans intentions or its understanding of the rules of the
game diers from that implied by their expression in human language (ul-
tural dierenes). There may be muh dispute over the question what Omega
really has in mind? We would like to onsider one of the variant that may be
interesting in the ontext of quantum market games [12, 20℄. This may result
from pondering over the meaning of the termOmega adopts the same strategy.
Players in a quantum market game sometimes buy and sometimes sell.
A demand representation of the player's strategy is a Fourier transform of
his strategy used while supplying the goods [12, 11℄. In a simplied model
where player's strategies span a nite dimensional Hilbert spae we should
apply disrete Fourier transform whih transforms the demand representa-
tion of the strategy, being m-tuple of omplex numbers 〈d|ψ〉 to the supply
representation given by
〈s|ψ〉 = 1√
m
m−1∑
d=0
e
2pii
m
sd〈d|ψ〉 .
If m = 2 then the disrete Fourier transform redues to the Hadamard
transform F whih we have already met. In our ase the Hadamrd trans-
form swithes maximally loalized strategies with the the maximally inde-
nite strategies and vie versa, eg. 〈d|ψ〉= [d=0]
F
−→ 〈s|ψ〉= 1√
2
(the Iverson
notation [22℄ is used: [expression] denotes the logial value (1 or 0) of the
sentene expression).
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We introdue the nonhomogeneous omplex oordinate z ∈ C to param-
eterize player's strategies
H ∋ |ψz〉 := |0〉+ z|1〉 .
If the "buying human" deides to use the strategy |ψz〉1 and the other side
of the bargain (Omega) want to play in the same way and therefore uses the
supply representation of human's strategy setting its q-bit to F(|0〉2+z|1〉2) =
|0〉2 +
1−z
1+z
|1〉2 then the quantum state of the game takes the form3
Wz =
(1+z)(1+z)
2(1+zz)2
(
|0〉1 + z |1〉1
)(
1〈0|+ z 1〈1|
)(
|0〉2 +
1−z
1+z
|1〉2
)(
2〈0|+
1−z
1+z 2
〈1|
)
.
Therefore, as in the previous disussion, the female strategy gives not higher
a pay-o. The expetation value of the human's pay-o, TrMWz, is maximal
for a superposition of male and female strategies with phase shifted by pi (i.e.
for z = −1). In this ase the human is better o than in the previous ase
but she or he must be autious beause the phase shift by pi (z = 1) does
not hange the respetive probabilities but result in the lowest expetation
value of the pay-o ($500). Classial human's strategies orrespond to z=0
(female) and z= ±∞ (male). The expetation values of the human pay-o
with respet to the adopted strategy are presented in Figure 1.
Enthusiasts for newombmania will ertainly nd a lot of new quantum
solutions to the Newomb game.
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